The proofs of Chaitin and Boolos for Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem are studied from the perspectives of constructibility and Rosserizability. By Rosserization of a proof we mean that the independence of the true but unprovable sentence can be shown by assuming only the (simple) consistency of the theory. It is known that Gödel's own proof for his incompleteness theorem is not Rosserizable, and we show that neither are Kleene's or Boolos' proofs. However, we prove a Rosserized version of Chaitin's (incompleteness) theorem. The proofs of Gödel, Rosser and Kleene are constructive in the sense that they explicitly construct, by algorithmic ways, the independent sentence(s) from the theory. We show that the proofs of Chaitin and Boolos are not constructive, and they prove only the mere existence of the independent sentences.
Introduction
A constructive proof provides an algorithm for constructing the claimed object; a non-constructive proof does not show the existence of that object algorithmically, while sometimes an effective procedure might be hidden inside the details. A proof then is proved to be (essentially) non-constructive when one can show that there is no algorithm (computable function) which, given the assumptions (coded as input), produces the claimed object whose existence is demonstrated in the proof. Below, we will see one example of a (seemingly) non-constructive proof (namely, the proof of Kleene [10] for Gödel's first incompleteness theorem) which can be constructive (effectivized) by unpacking some details; we will also see a couple of proofs (namely, the proofs of Boolos [2] and Chaitin [3] for Gödel's first incompleteness theorem) that are shown to be non-constructive, by proving the non-existence of any algorithm for computing the claimed object (namely, the true but unprovable sentence).
Gödel's original proof [5] for his incompleteness theorem is constructive, i.e., given a (finite) description of a consistent RE theory (e.g. an input-free program which outputs the set of all the axioms of the theory) the proof exhibits, in an algorithmic way, a sentence which is true (in the standard model of natural numbers N) but unprovable in the theory. For the independence of this sentence from the theory (i.e., the unprovability of its negation in the theory) Gödel also assumes the theory to be ω-consistent; so if the theory is ω-consistent, then that (true) sentence is independent from the theory (see e.g. [19, 18] ). It turned out later that the simple consistency of the theory does not suffice for the independence of the Gödel sentence (from the theory) and the optimal condition (which is much weaker than ω-consistency) is the consistency of the theory with its own consistency statement ([6, Theorems 35, 36] ). Rosser's proof [14] for Gödel's first incompleteness theorem assumes only the simple consistency of the (RE) theory and constructs (algorithmically) an independent (and true) sentence. So, one can say that Gödel's proof is not Rosserizable. Here, we will see that while the proof of Chaitin is Rosserizable (i.e., the independence of Chaitin's sentence from the theory can be proved by assuming only the simple consistency of the theory), the proof of Boolos is not (and the optimal condition for the independence of Boolos' sentence is the consistency of the theory with its own consistency statement).
The Proof of Kleene for Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem
A very cute proof for Gödel's incompleteness theorem is that of Kleene (see e.g. [10, 18] ) which deserves more recognition.
Notation 2.1 (Computability)
Let ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , · · · be a list of all unary computable (partial recursive) functions. A recursively enumerable set (RE for short) is the domain of ϕ i , for some i ∈ N, which is denoted by W i . The notation ϕ i ( j)↑ symbolizes the fact that the function ϕ i is not defined at j, or j ∈ W i ; thus ϕ i ( j)↓ means that ϕ i is defined at j or j ∈ W i , and ϕ i ( j)↓= k means that ϕ i is defined at j and equals to k, i.e., ϕ i ( j) = k.
⊕ ⊗
Robinson's Arithmetic is denoted by Q (see e.g. [18] ).
Theorem 2.2 (Kleene's Theorem)
For a given consistent and RE theory T that contains Q there exists some t ∈ N such that ϕ t (t)↑ but T "ϕ t (t)↑".
Non-Constructive Proof
contradicting the consistency of T . Now, since T is RE then so is K T , while K is not an RE set because for any n we have n ∈ K ⇐⇒ n ∈ W n and so
Of course if T is sound (i.e., N |= T ) or even Σ 1 -sound (i.e., T ⊢ σ ∈ Σ 1 =⇒ N |= σ , cf. [6] ) then also T "ϕ t (t)↓", i.e., the sentence "ϕ t (t)↑" is (true and) independent from T . Let us note that the above proof did not explicitly specify t ∈ N.
Constructive Proof
Since K T = {n ∈ N | T ⊢ "ϕ n (n)↑"} is RE then K T = W t for some t ∈ N which can be algorithmically computed from a description of the RE theory T . Now we show the truth of "ϕ t (t)↑" as follows:
(by the definition of W t ) Thus, t ∈ W t and so t ∈ K T whence T "ϕ t (t)↑".
⊠ ⊞
For Rosserizing this beautiful theorem of Kleene some more tools and techniques are needed; see [11] where Kleene calls it the "symmetric form" of Gödel's (incompleteness) theorem (see also [16] for a modern treatment). Below we show that Kleene's (constructive) proof cannot be Rosserized per se and those new tools and techniques are really needed. There exists an RE and consistent theory U such that U ⊢ "ϕ u (u)↓" for some u ∈ N which satisfies (ϕ u (u)↑ and)
Proof
There exists a computable (and total) functionh such that for any sentence ψ we have
Summing up, for any consistent and RE extension T of Q we have ϕ t (t)↑ and T "ϕ t (t)↑" for any t which satisfies
↑ is independent from T (i.e., also T "ϕ t (t)↓"). However, if the theory T is not Σ 1 -sound then ϕ t (t)↑ might not be independent from T (and its negation could be provable in T ) for some t with W t = {n ∈ N | T ⊢ "ϕ n (n)↑ "}.
The Proof of Chaitin for Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem
There are various versions of Chaitin's proof for the incompleteness theorem [3] , which is sometimes called "Chaitin's incompleteness theorem"; this proof appears in e.g. [4, 13, 1, 20] . We consider the version presented in [1] .
Definition 3.1 (Kolmogorov-Chaitin Complexity)
For any natural number m let
The function K is total and for any e ∈ N there are finitely many m's which satisfy K (m) e. The following is Lemma 7 of [1] .
Lemma 3.2 (Uncomputability of Complexity)
There is no computable function f which satisfies K f (m) > m for all m ∈ N.
Proof
If there were such a computable function f , then by Kleene's second recursion theorem there would exist some e such that ϕ e (x) = f (e) and so, in particular, ϕ e (0) = f (e) which implies K f (e) e; a contradiction. ⊠ ⊞ So, the function K is not computable, since otherwise f (x) = min{y | K (y) > x}, which satisfies ∀x : K f (x) > x, would be computable.
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Theorem 3.3 (Chaitin's Theorem)
For any consistent and RE theory T which contains Q there exists a constant c T ∈ N such that for any e c T and any w ∈ N we have T "K (w) > e".
Proof
If not, then for any given m ∈ N there exists some e m and some w such that T ⊢ "K (w) > e". Let us note that if T ⊢ "K (w) > e" for a consistent T ⊇ Q then K (w) > e, since otherwise, if K (w) e, the true Σ 1 -sentence "K (w) e" would be provable in Q (and so in T ) which contradicts the consistency of T . Now, for a given m we can, by an algorithmic proof search in T , find some e m and w such that T ⊢ "K (w) > e" (and so K (w) > e); our assumption guarantees the termination of this algorithm for any input m. Let f (m) be one of those w's; then K f (m) > e m contradicting Lemma 3.2.
⊠ ⊞ This is an incompleteness theorem since for any c there are cofinitely many w's with K (w) > c. So, for a given T which is consistent and RE and contains Q there are cofinitely many w's such that the true sentences "K (w) > c T " are unprovable in T .
As for the constructivity of this proof, the good news is that a constant c T which satisfies Chaitin's Theorem (3.3) can be algorithmically constructed from T .
Theorem 3.4 (Computing a Chaitin Constant)
For a given consistent and RE extension T of Q one can algorithmically construct a constant c T such that for all e c T and all w, we have T "K (w) > e".
Proof
Given a description of a consistent, Σ 1 -complete and RE theory T the following can be done algorithmically. Defineh(x, y) to be the minimum of the ordered pairs (in a total and computable sorting of all ordered pairs) a, b such that b x and T ⊢ "K (a) > b" (if any). This is (a partially) computable (function) and an index of it can be calculated from (a description of) T . By Kleene's second recursion theorem there exists a constant c such that ϕ c (y) =h 1 (c, y), whereh 1 There is no algorithm such that for a given consistent and RE extension T of Q can compute some w T such that both T "K (w T ) > c T " and K (w T ) > c T hold together, where c T is a Chaitin constant as in Theorem 3.4.
If such a w T were computable from T , then the theory T ∞ = i∈N T i would be RE where T 0 = Q and inductively T i+1 = T i + "K (w T i ) > c T i " are defined by iterating the computation procedure. The theory T ∞ is also consistent (indeed, sound) and contains Q, so by Chaitin's Theorem (3.3) there should exist some constant c T ∞ such that for no w can we have T ∞ ⊢ "K (w) > c T ∞ ". But this is a contradiction because we have c T i < c T i+1 and also c T i < c T ∞ for all i ∈ N.
⊠ ⊞
The true unprovable sentences "K (w) > e" (for e c T ) are also independent when T is a (Σ 1 -)sound theory: If T ⊢ "K (w) e" then the Σ 1 -sentence K (w) e has to be true, a contradiction. So, we restate Chaitin's Theorem as follows.
Corollary 3.6 (Chaitin's Theorem, restated)
For any Σ 1 -sound and RE theory T with T ⊇ Q there is some c T (which is computable from T ) such that for any e c T there are cofinitely many w's such that "K (w) > e" is independent from T . ⊠ ⊞ By Rosserizing Chaitin's Theorem we mean replacing the assumption of the "Σ 1 -soundness" (of T ) in Corollary 3.6 with (its simple) "consistency". For doing that we need the following version of the Pigeonhole Principle in Q.
Lemma 3.7 (A Pigeonhole Principle)
For any k ∈ N we have
Proof
This can be proved by induction (in the metalanguage) on k: for k = 0 it suffices to note that Q ⊢ ∀z¬(z < 0) and for the induction step it suffices to use the derivation Q ⊢ ∀z(
Theorem 3.8 (Rosserization of Chaitin's Theorem)
For any consistent and RE extension T of Q there is a constant c T (which is computable from T ) such that for any e c T there are cofinitely many w's such that "K (w) > e" is independent from T .
Proof By Chaitin's Theorem (3.3) there exists a constant c T (which is computable from T ) such that for any e c T there are cofinitely many w's such that "K (w) > e" is true but unprovable in T . Fix an e c T . For no w can T ⊢ "K (w) > e" hold, and T ⊢ "K (w) e" can hold for at most (e + 1)-many w's: if for some distinct w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w e+1 , the derivations
which contradicts Lemma 3.7 (for k = e + 1). Thus, for cofinitely many w's we should have both T "K (w) > e" and T "K (w) e". ⊠ ⊞ Martin Davis [4] calls Chaitin's Theorem "a dramatic extension of Gödel's incompleteness theorem". We saw that this theorem as presented in Corollary 3.6 can be hardly considered an extension of Gödel's incompleteness theorem, as Gödel's proof is constructive while Chaitin's is not (Theorem 3.5). The Rosserized form of Chaitin's Theorem as presented in Theorem 3.8 could be considered as an extension of Gödel's and Chaitin's theorems in a sense (from the Rosserization viewpoint), even though, it is not any more extension than Rosser's own [14] ; let us also note that Rosser's proof is constructive (while the proof of Theorem 3.8 is not).
have ever seen" 1 . After its first appearance in [2] this proof was discussed, extended and studied in e.g. [7, 8, 15, 12, 17, 9] .
Notation 4.1 (Arithmetization)
For an RE theory T denote the provability predicate of T by Pr T (x); so the consistency statement of T is Con(T ) = ¬Pr T (⊥). Suppose that the variables are x, x ′ , x ′′ , x ′′′ , · · · whose lengths are 1, 2, 3, 4, · · · , respectively. ⊕ ⊗ So, for any k ∈ N there are at most finitely many formulas with length k. 
, where len(x) denotes the length of (the formula with Gödel code) x. The formula Def T (y, z) states that "there is a formula ψ(x 1 , · · · , x m ) with length smaller than z such that T ⊢ ∀x[ψ(x, · · · , x) ↔ x = y]", or informally "the number y is definable in T by a formula with length less than z".
, meaning that "u is the least number not definable by a formula with length less than v". Let ℓ T be the length of Berry T (x, x ′ ) and Boolos T (x) = ∃x ′ x ′ = 5·ℓ T ∧Berry T (x, x ′ ) . Let b T be the least number not definable by a formula with length less than 5ℓ T . ⊕ ⊗ Peano's Arithmetic is denoted by PA (see e.g. [18] ).
Theorem 4.3 (Boolos' Theorem)
For any consistent and RE extension T of PA, the sentence
Thus, b T is definable in T by the formula Boolos T (x) whose length is less than ℓ T + len(5 · ℓ T ) + 9 = 4ℓ T + 26 < 5ℓ T (since, for any m, the term m = s(· · · (s(0)) . . .) [m-times s] has length 3m + 1). So, the
The formula Boolos T (b T ) is not Π 1 ; however, the following modification from [7] proves a Π 1 -incompleteness.
Theorem 4.4 (Boolos' Theorem, modified)
For any consistent and RE extension T of PA, the true
Since any number y less than b T is definable by a formula with length less than 5ℓ T then the
Even though ℓ T is computable from T , below we show that one cannot calculate b T .
Theorem 4.5 (Non-Constructivity of Boolos' Proof)
There is no algorithm such that for a given consistent and RE extension T of PA can compute b T .
Proof
Assume that b T is computable from T , and let T 0 = PA and inductively
Define the functionh(n), for any n ∈ N, to be the maximum of m's such that ∀ j < m : len("ϕ j (0)↓= x") < n. This is a computable and non-decreasing function; also lim nh (n) = ∞. So, from lim j ℓ T j = ∞ we have lim jh (5ℓ T j ) = ∞. Therefore, for any (given) x one can compute some ι(x) such thath(5ℓ T ι(x) ) > x. The proof will be complete when show that K (b T j ) h(5ℓ T j ) holds for any j: Because, by the computability of b T j from j, we will have a computable function x → b T ι(x) which satisfies ∀x :
h(5ℓ T ι(x) ) > x contradicting Lemma 3.2. For showing that K (b T j ) h(5ℓ T j ) holds for any j, we show more generally that for any u, v if ¬Def T (u, v) holds, for some T ⊇ PA, then K (u) h(v): If, on the contrary, we have K (u) <h(v) then there exists some j such that (1) j <h(v) and (2) ϕ j (0)↓= u. By (2) the number u is definable by the formula "ϕ j (0)↓= x" in PA (and so in T ), and by (1) the length of the formula "ϕ j (0)↓= x" is less than v; so Def T (u, v) should hold, a contradiction.
However, we show in the following theorem that if T is not
, and so ¬Boolos T (b T ), could be provable in T . For the following theorem to make sense we note that there exists a consistent theory S such that S + Con(S) is not consistent: The theory S = PA + ¬Con(PA) is consistent by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, and S ⊢ ¬Con(S) because S ⊢ ¬Con(PA) and S ⊃ PA. 
If T ⊢ ¬Con(T ) then T ⊢ Pr T (⊥) and so T ⊢ Pr T (ψ) for any ψ. In particular, if ψ is a formula with length less than 5ℓ T (for example Berry(x, ⊠ ⊞ Thus, the consistency of T + Con(T ) is an optimal (indeed, necessary and sufficient) condition for the independence of a Boolos sentence from T .
Concluding Remarks
The following [13] , [20] , Theorem 3.5 Theorem 3.8 BOOLOS (1989) [2] X Theorem 4.5 X Theorem 4.6 Let us note that for the constructivity of a proof, usually, no new argument is needed as a computational procedure could often be seen from the proof. But the noncosntructivity of a proof (as in the case of Chaitin's and Boolos' proofs) should be proved; proving the non-constructivity (the non-existence of any algorithm) is usually harder than showing the constructivity (the existence of an algorithm). So is the Rosserizability of a proof. Other than Rosser's proof and Kleene's symmetric theorem (1950) Chaitin's proof is also Rosserizable. The non-Rosserizable proofs of Gödel and Boolos need the consistency of T + Con(T ) for the independence of their true but unprovable sentences, and this condition, Con T + Con(T ) , is optimal (for the independence of that sentences). The authors know no similar optimal condition(s) for the independence of Kleene's sentence in his first (1936) proof.
